This paper develops a stochastic general equilibrium inventory model for an oligopoly, in which all inventory constraint parameters are endogenously determined. We propose several systems of demand processes whose distributions are functions of all retailers' prices and all retailers' service levels. We proceed with the investigation of the equilibrium behavior of infinite horizon models for industries facing this type of generalized competition, under demand uncertainty.
Introduction and Summary
We develop a stochastic general equilibrium inventory model for an oligopoly in which firms compete in terms of two strategic instruments, i.e., (i) their prices (or expected sales targets), and (ii) their service level targets, in particular their fill rates. The fill rate is the fraction of demand that can be met from existing inventory.
1 Each firm complements its choice of a service level target and pricing strategy with an appropriate inventory strategy.
To build the general equilibrium model, we propose several demand models, where the stochastic demands are functions of all retailers' prices and all retailers' service levels. In a periodic review, infinite horizon setting, the retailers face a stream of demands that are independent across time but not necessarily across the retailers. End-of-the-period inventories are carried over to the next period. Stockouts are backlogged.
2 Customer sales are final, i.e.,
they cannot be cancelled when the customer needs to wait for delivery. Each retailer may, at the beginning of each period, place an order with his supplier, who fills the orders instantaneously or after a given lead time. The retailers incur retailer-specific inventory carrying costs. We consider both the case where direct (retailer specific), out-of-pocket, backlogging costs prevail and the common case without such direct stockout costs. Our model applies both to retailers selling to the final consumer, as well as to vendors selling to retailers. (In describing and analyzing the model, we confine ourselves to the former setting.)
We observe an increasing number of industries in which some of the competing firms aggressively attempt to obtain larger market shares by providing higher levels of service.
For example, in the fierce competition between amazon.com and barnesandnoble.com, the latter initiated a massive advertising campaign promising same business day delivery in various parts of the country. The same firms are also examples of companies routinely posting expected waiting times by item or group of items. In the video rental industry,
Blockbuster launched an advertising campaign in 1997, emphasizing high fill rates with its "Go Home Happy" slogan, and backing their promise up with a free rental guarantee under the slogan "I'll Be There" (see e.g., Dana 2001) . 3 Similarly, Domino's has offered a 30-minute 1 Alternatively, the expected value or a given fractile of the waiting time experienced by the customer may be used as the service level target; see Bernstein and Federgruen (2002) for a treatment of this variant.
2 The model can be extended to the case where stockouts result in lost sales; the profit functions and resulting analysis become somewhat complex.
3 Their comparatively high fill rates were enabled by a novel revenue sharing contract with the movie studios, reducing the wholesale price per tape by a factor of ten, approximately. Blockbuster's strategic move to increase its fill rates dramatically is generally credited for the company's acquiring a dominating delivery guarantee for its pizza sales, backed up with a free-of-charge delivery if the time limit is exceeded. In B2B-settings, it is well known that vendors routinely specify allowable windows for order delivery times and they, too, often back these up with chargebacks in case their service targets are violated.
4
Even if most retailers do not yet advertise their service levels, "customer service level as measured by % of time product is in stock" is now recognized by retail executives as one of the most important performance metrics, ahead of traditional key measures such as "sales per selling square foot," 5 An industry of "secret shoppers" has emerged to provide retail management with independent estimates of various customer service levels, while various internet firms continuously gather and report information on on-line retailers.
6
Ever since the seminal papers by Arrow et al. (1951) and Dvoretzky et al. (1952) , a massive literature has addressed inventory systems under uncertainty. These papers provide a systematic tradeoff for two competing risks, i.e., the risk of overstockage and that of understockage. It is relatively easy to assess the consequences of the former since the costs of carrying inventories can be measured or estimated in a fairly straightforward manner. At the same time, the consequences of shortages are much harder to quantify. Most standard inventory models assume that when shortages can be backlogged, the cost associated with a given backlog size can be assessed as an exogenous input to the model. Much has been written about the difficulty of specifying backlogging cost rates. Often, no out-of-pocket expense is associated with a stockout and even if such out-of-pocket penalties prevail, it is generally agreed upon that backlogging cost rates or stockout penalties should, in addition, reflect the long term or equilibrium impact on goodwill and market shares. The latter is hard to quantify, at least in the absence of a complete model describing the impact of the relative service levels offered by competing firms on each of their demand processes. As a consequence, many practitioners are more comfortable with a model in which (production, market share of close to 35% and for its parent company Viacom seeing its stock doubled during the first year of this initiative. 4 Independent software firms, such as Compliance Networks, provide retailers with tracking systems to monitor the vendors' compliance with the pre-specified service targets as well as with data comparing groups of vendors' fill rates and on-time shipment performance (see Chain Store Age 2002b).
5 See for example the recent survey of Bearing Point (formerly KPMG Consulting) in Chain Store Age (2002a), conducted in cooperation with Washington Inventory Services. 6 Two examples are bizrate.com and resellerrating.com. The former guides retailers on the basis of a number of "post-fulfillment satisfaction" measures, in particular "availability of product you wanted" (defined as "product was in stock at time of expected delivery") and "on-time delivery" (defined as "product arrived when expected").
distribution and carrying) costs are minimized subject to given service level constraints, e.g., fill rates satisfying given minimum fill rate bounds. Alternatively, an upper bound on the expected value or a given fractile of the customer waiting time may be imposed. However, here too, it is unclear whether a company should strive for a 90%, 95% or 99% fill rate or promise a 24 hour-, two business day-or one week response time, say, and what the long term revenue implications of this choice may be. The need to endogenize fill rate and stockout cost parameters via a model with competing firms was first articulated by Li (1992) .
An additional complication is that virtually all inventory models assume that a company's demands are not affected by its service levels, let alone by those of its competitors.
We systematically characterize the equilibrium behavior of the industry under three pos- a stationary base-stock policy to control its inventory, i.e., the firm increases its inventory to a given base-stock level whenever it is below this level and avoids placing replenishment orders otherwise. Under scenarios (II) and (III), the equilibrium infinite-horizon strategies are of the same type, except that under (II) each firm selects a long-run service level along with the other choices and under (III) in advance of selecting a price-and base-stock policy combination. The critical control parameters for the equilibrium strategies in the infinite horizon model are easily derived from the equilibrium of the reduced game. The equivalency results between the infinite horizon and the reduced games are obtained for fully general stochastic demand functions of the price and service vectors. As with dynamic programs with a single decision maker, it is rare that infinite horizon stochastic games
The remainder of the paper is, therefore, devoted to the characterization of the equilibrium behaviors in the reduced games; these depend critically on the type of stochastic demand functions. We consider three of the most frequently used classes of demand functions in the marketing and industrial organization literature, appropriately adjusted for their dependence on the vector of service levels. The attraction models represent the first such class: with a fixed total potential market size, each firm acquires a market share which is proportional to an attraction value given by a (possibly firm-dependent) general function of its price and service level. Bell et al. (1975) 
Literature Review
It appears that Schwartz (1966) was the first to reject the usual assumption in inventory models of a fixed penalty for stockouts. Schwartz (1970) explicitly models, in a single location setting, the impact of stockouts on future sales: demand in a given period equals the potential demand multiplied with a factor that depends on the observed fill rate and the rate at which customers forgive the firms for the stockouts. See Hill (1976) for a generalization of this model. Caine and Plaut (1976) consider a periodic review model with demands whose means are a function of the fill rates. Robinson (1991) provides a further generalization where the mean and variance of each period's demand varies linearly with the number of satisfied customers in the previous period. Ernst and Cohen (1992) and Ernst and Powell (1995) consider a single-supplier single-retailer system in which the demands faced by the retailers have a mean and standard deviation which depend on the steady-state service level. Ernst and Powell (1998) model this system as a Stackelberg game, with the supplier as the leader.
Several economists, starting with Dorfman and Steiner (1954) , have realized that representing demands as a function of the sales price(s) only may oversimplify customer preferences. In the context of deterministic monopoly models, these and other authors (e.g., Spence 1975 Spence , 1976 Dixit 1979; Tirole 1988, §2. 2) have considered a demand function with an additional attribute variable, referred to as "advertising", "service level" or "quality." Carlton (1989) and Carlton and Perloff (1999) argue that demand functions should be specified as a function of prices and customer service levels, which he quantifies by the customer's expected waiting time. See Table 15 .3 in Carlton (1989) for estimates of price and "deliverylag" elasticities in a variety of industries. Karmarkar and Pitbladdo (1997) consider a multidimensional quality measure in the demand functions. They address perfect competition and oligopolistic markets, where the oligopoly equilibrium is specified by an entry and exit condition under which the profits of all firms are driven to zero.
In contrast, Banker et al. (1998) and Tsay and Agrawal (2000) Li (1992) appears to be the first to model horizontal competition between firms facing uncertain demands (and) or supplies. The firms offer an identical product and charge equal prices but compete in terms of their production/inventory strategies. Customers arrive according to a Poisson process, and purchase with equal probability from any firm with positive inventory. If all firms are out of stock, the customer places the order with each firm, but buys from the firm which completes the order first, a practice common in the semiconductor industry. Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) develop a single period model for firms producing a homogenous good. Similar to our scenario (III), the firms select a capacity level in a first stage and actual production quantities in a second stage; the common price is a linear function of the total quantity offered in the market, with a random intercept. Carr et al. (1999) develop a single period model for firms competing in terms of their prices and facing linear stochastic demand functions. Bernstein and Federgruen (2001a) , similarly, develop a single period model for firms facing price competition under a general class of stochastic demand functions. Kirman and Sobel (1974) and Bernstein and Federgruen (2001b) appear to be the first infinite horizon models for an industry with firms competing in terms of their prices only. We refer to Bernstein and Federgruen (2001a) for a review of several (singleperiod) models in which retailers compete via their starting inventories. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to address an oligopoly under uncertain demands, with price-and service level competition.
Model and Notation
Consider where the cdf of D it , denoted byG i (x|p, f ), depends on the entire vector p as well as the complete vector of service levels f . Thus, demands in any period depend on the target fill rates, not on the actual inventory levels. We assume that the demand variables are of the multiplicative form, i.e.,
with it a general continuous random variable whose distribution is stationary and independent of the retail price vector p and the service level vector f , i.e., for all i = 1, ..., N the sequence { it } has a common general cdf G i (·) and density function g i (·) such that
The multiplicative model implies that the coefficients of variation of the one-period demands are exogenous constants, independent of the price vector or the service levels and 8 If a service level below 0.5 is used, customers are more likely to experience a backlog than not; in this case, characteristics of the customer waiting time, e.g., its expected value or a given fractile of the waiting time should be used to characterize the customer service level (see Bernstein and Federgruen 2002) .
hence of the expected sales volumes as well. Without loss of generality, we normalize
In other words, the functions {d i (p, f )} may be viewed as representing the expected one-period sales volumes. As in virtually all inventory models, we assume that the sequence of random variables { it : t = 1, 2, ...} and hence the sequence {D it : t = 1, 2, ...}, are independent for all i = 1, ..., N . At the same time, we allow for arbitrary correlations between the demands faced by the different retailers, in any given period.
Information about the firms' service levels is not always as readily available as the unit price. As mentioned, in the B2B-world, service level guarantees are routinely provided by the vendors, often backed up with chargeback agreements for violations of these guarantees.
Software systems allow retailers to monitor their vendors' compliance and provide them with comparative data regarding groups of vendors' service levels. We also mentioned several examples in the B2C-world, where firms advertise service level measures, as well as independent internet services which rate on-line retailers in terms of their fill rate performance (along with other service measures). Even when such information is not publicly available, consumers develop estimates on the basis of their own (repeat-purchase) experience as well as on the basis of word-of-mouth and other reputational information (see Tirole 1988, §2.3 , for a general discussion of the consumers' ability to assess quality attributes of competing products and its implications for industrial organization models).
At this stage, we make minimal assumptions regarding the shape of the mean sales functions {d i (p, f )}, other than the following basic monotonicity properties:
In other words, if a retailer increases his retail price [fill rate], this results in a decrease
[increase] of his own expected sales while increasing [decreasing] those of his competitors.
No firm's sales are expected to increase under a uniform price increase:
Decisions are made in the following sequence: at the beginning of each period, all retailers simultaneously determine their price and order quantity for that period; next, these orders are filled.
9 Similarly, aggregate sales usually decrease if one of the firms increases its price:
Each retailer pays the supplier a constant per unit wholesale price, inclusive of delivery costs, or he incurs production costs at a constant rate. ( 
The Infinite Horizon Model: Reduction to Single or

Two-Stage Games
In this Section, we show that under each of the competitive scenarios, (I)-(III), the equilibrium behavior in the infinite horizon model may be characterized by analyzing that of an equivalent single-stage or, in case (III), two-stage game.
We start with the simultaneous price-and service-competition scenario (II) and show that in the infinite horizon retailer game, an N -tuple of stationary strategies arises as a Nash equilibrium, where each retailer i adopts a fill rate f * i , a constant price p * i and a base-stock policy with stationary base-stock level y * i . Moreover, the triplet (p * , f * , y * ) represents a Nash equilibrium in a single stage game with the following profit function for retailer i:
where retailer i's action set is given by the following subset of 3 :
While a retailer's price p and fill rate f have a potential impact on all retailers' profits, his choice of a base-stock level y affects his own profit function only. Thus, each retailer i chooses y i to maximize his profit, while ensuring a service level at least equal to the announced service level f i . That is, for given p and f , retailer i chooses an order-up-to level
This gives rise to an equivalent reduced single-stage retailer game in which each retailer i competes with two instruments (
] × [0, 1) and reduced profit functions:
Note that k i (f ) is the expected (end-of-period) inventory cost per unit of sales, required to guarantee a given service level of at least f . The reduced single stage game is equivalent to an oligopoly model with deterministic demands d(p, f ) and cost functions
. It is the cost structure which sets the model apart from other oligopoly models with competition with two or more strategic instruments (see e.g., Basuroy and
Nguyen 1998, and the references therein). (The only exception is the price-quality two stage model in Anderson et al. 1992 , which considers identical retailers and a special case of the demand functions in §5.1.)
We now show that if a pair of vectors (p * , f * ) is a Nash equilibrium of the (reduced)
single stage game, an N-tuple of infinite horizon strategies can be constructed which is a Nash equilibrium in the original infinite horizon game. In §5-7, we exhibit several important classes of demand functions for which the reduced single-stage or two-stage games, in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, have an equilibrium so that Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 apply. Lemma 1 describes the shape of the k i (·)−functions.
Theorem 1 Consider scenario (II) (simultaneous price-and service-competition). Assume
(p * , f * ) is aπ i (p) def = π i (p,f ). Assume p * (f ) is aprofit functionsπ i (f ) def = π i (p * (f ), f),Lemma 1 (a) k i (·) is increasing and differentiable. (b) k i (·) is convex, twice differentiable for all f i = h − i /(h − i + h + i ), and lim f i →1 k i (f i ) = ∞, for all distributions G i such that: (P F 2 ) G i is log-concave or,
equivalently, is a Polya Frequency function of order 2 (5)
for all x ≥ G −1 i (0.5), and g i has infinite support, (5) is trivially satisfied for all distributions whose density function decreases beyond the median, e.g., the Normal and Exponential distributions and many specifications of the Gamma and Weibull distributions. The condition is closely related to the more common condition that the density functions be log-concave or P F 2 (see e.g., Barlow
and Proschan 1965). By Lemma 5.8 and Theorem 5.6 ibid, the latter condition implies that the complements of the cdfs G i are P F 2 . Lemma 1 is intuitive: the operational costs increase convexly with the service level.
10
10 As mentioned, this shape of the cost-service tradeoff function has been assumed ex ante in the service/quality competition models of Anderson et al. (1992, page 239) , Besanko et al. (1998) and Tsay and Agrawal (2000) .
Attraction Models
Many marketing models characterize the market shares obtained by competing retailers via a vector of attraction values a = (a 1 , ..., a N ). The market share achieved by a given firm i is given by its attraction value divided by the industry's total value, i.e., by
with a 0 the value of the no-purchase option. Bell et al. (1975) show that if market shares are exclusively determined by the attraction vector a, they must be given by the simple ratios (6), provided four general assumptions are satisfied. Attraction models are among the most commonly used market share models, both in empirical studies and theoretical models (see e.g., Leeflang et al. 2000) . In standard marketing models, the attraction values a may depend on the price vector and/or other marketing instruments such as advertising efforts.
Here, we will assume that a 0 is a constant and the attraction value of any firm i is given by a general, twice differentiable, function of its price and service level, i.e., a i = a i (p i , f i ), with
With fixed total market size M, this results in the following mean demand functions:
Most attraction models assume a specific structure for the functions a i (·, ·), most commonly the "Multiplicative Competitive Interaction" structure which, when applied to the pair of
i or the MNL model where
(for constants α i , β i , c i > 0). See Anderson et al. (1992) or Mahajan and van Ryzin (1999) for a discussion of how the MNL model arises from either a random utility model or a set of choice axioms, similar to, though somewhat more restrictive than those of Bell et al. (1975) .
11
Below we pay special attention to the following generalization of (9)
11 Recent econometric studies based on the MNL model include Berry et al. (1995) , Villas-Boas and Winer (1995) and Besanko et al. (1998); see McFadden (1980 see McFadden ( , 1986 , Schmalensee and Thisse (1988) and Urban and Hauser (1980) for reviews of earlier applications.
where the functions b i (·) are twice differentiable, increasing and concave, permitting us to represent settings where the marginal increase in a firm's attraction value, due to an increase in its fill rate, is non-negative but decreasing in f i . Alternatively, if a firm wants to maintain a given attraction value, it needs to compensate for a price increase with ever larger increases in its service level.
Analysis of the General Attraction Model
For the single stage price game under a given vector of service levels f , we need the following lemma, which follows by simple calculus. Letã i = log a i andd i = log d i .
Lemma 2 Assume the mean sales volumes {d i (p i , f i )} are given by the attraction model (8).
Note that condition (D) requires that (a) The price game has a Nash equilibrium. The set of Nash equilibria is a lattice and, therefore, has a smallest p(f ) and a largest p(f ) element.
The proof of Theorem 2 shows that the single stage price game is supermodular. One of the implications of this characterization is that a simple, so-called tatônnement or Round
Robin scheme, converges to p(f )[p(f )] provided it starts with an arbitrary price vector 
The left hand side of (12) is increasing and the right hand side decreasing in p,
is decreasing in p while the same is true for −( 
In particular, f * 
The (Generalized) MNL Model
We now give special attention to the (generalized) MNL model (10). Under this structure, each functionã i is concave in p i so that a unique Nash equilibrium p * (f ) exists in the singlestage price game, under any fixed vector of service levels f , assuming (D) holds (as is the case, for example, when all α i = α, i = 1, ..., N , see (11)).
Similarly, the simultaneous single stage (reduced) game has a Nash equilibrium (p * 
By Lemma 1 and the concavity of the b i -functions,
, and δ i increases to +∞, as f i 1. When an out-of-pocket rate h
, we assume that k i (0.5) < b i (0.5)/α i to preclude unrealistic settings where firm i is "best off" with a fill rate of less than 50%. Either way, we have that f
The first term to the right of (15) represents the incremental operational costs associated with a marginal increase in the service level, while the second term denotes the incremental retail price value, i.e., the price increase which this marginal increase permits without altering the attraction value of firm i. f 0 i thus represents the unique service level for which the incremental operational costs equal the incremental retail price value. We conclude:
Theorem 4 Consider the MNL model and assume (D) holds. For every fixed service level vector f , there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
is the unique Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous single stage (reduced) retailer game.
Note that each of the unique equilibrium service levels f * i = f 0 i only depends on retailer i's characteristics {k i (·), b i (·) and α i }; in particular, the equilibrium service level f * i is invariant to any changes in the characteristics of the competitors and resulting changes in their equilibrium service levels and prices. This is in contrast to the general attraction model, Observe, however, that in the simultaneous game the service levels f 0 fail to be dominant.
In particular, if some of firm i's competitors j choose retail prices p j = p * j (f ), firm i's best corresponding service level may depend on all prices and service levels chosen by the competitors. This is demonstrated in Example 1.
Example 1 Let N = 3, M = 100 and a 0 = 0, w i = 10, h Returning to the single stage price game, Theorem 5 below shows that in the MNL model, it is possible to fully characterize whether a change in one of the firms' service levels will result in an increase or decrease in each of the equilibrium prices. 
When firm i decides to increase its service level, it will always cause an increase in its own equilibrium retail price, i.e., the firm is able to charge a higher retail price in exchange for offering a higher service level. The impact of the service level increase on the competitors' prices depends however on whether the service level is below or above the critical value f 
, f) denote the expected sales volume and profit value under the vector of service levels f , assuming all firms adopt equilibrium retail prices.
Theorem 6 Consider the MNL model and assume (D)
.
(c)
The vector f 0 is a dominant solution in the two stage game, with p = p * (f 0 ) the unique Nash equilibrium for its second stage.
The above dominance result is in sharp contrast to settings where retail prices fail to be in equilibrium, i.e., where the vector of prevailing retail prices p = p * (f ). Here, each firm's optimal service level may critically depend on the service levels and/or retail prices offered by the competitors. As discussed in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Chapter 4) , it is infrequent that a two-stage game can be shown to possess a Nash equilibrium. It is even more remarkable that the first stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium of the strongest possible kind: f 0 is a dominant solution.
As mentioned in §2, Anderson et al. (1992) consider a special case of the model, with fully identical retailers and linear functions b i (f i ) = θf i for some θ > 0. These authors focus on the sequential game and establish the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium, which, in the case of two firms is shown to be the unique Nash equilibrium. (It is easily verified that when the retailers have identical demand and cost characteristics, the vectors f 0 and p
have identical components as well.) The authors also note (page 241, footnote 4) that the same symmetric solution is a Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous game as well.
The Linear Model
We now consider the case where the average demand functions d(p, f ) are linear in all pricesand service levels. As mentioned in the Introduction, this linear structure was considered in Banker et al. (1998) and Tsay and Agrawal (2000) . Thus, let
with b i , c ij , β i and γ ij positive constants, to ensure that the monotonicity properties in (2) are satisfied. Throughout this Section we assume that (D) holds, which translates to b i > j =i c ij , i = 1, ..., N . As in the attraction models, we start with the single-stage price game.
Theorem 7 Consider, for the linear model, the single stage price game which arises when the vector of service levels f is fixed.
(a) The price game has a unique equilibrium p * (f ), with As in the MNL model, if firm j's service level f j goes up, the retail price offered by every competing firm i = j decreases, as long as the service level stays below a critical level f * ij , while resulting in a price increase for f j > f * ij . Contrary to the MNL model, a different critical level may, however, prevail for each of firm j's competitors and f * ij = 0.5 may arise, in which case a service level increase by firm j is always met by a price increase by competitor i. In contrast to the MNL model, when a firm increases its service level, this does not necessarily allow the firm to increase its price. This prima facie surprising phenomenon arises when the service level increase causes the firm's competitors to reduce their prices by a significantly larger amount to offset the impact of the service level increase. It appears that this is most likely to occur when a firm whose clientele is relatively price-sensitive but insensitive to service, needs to compete with other firms whose customers have the opposite attributes. As in the MNL model, p * (f ) is easily computed via the tatônnement scheme.
We now proceed with the simultaneous single stage game in which prices and service levels are chosen simultaneously. As in (15) for the MNL model, we assume k i (0.5) <
, to preclude unrealistic settings where firm i is "best off" offering a fill rate of less than 50%.
Theorem 8 The simultaneous (reduced) single stage game for the linear model has a unique
Nash equilibrium (p * (f 0 ), f 0 ), with f 0 i the unique solution to the equation
As in the MNL model, the simultaneous single stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium service level f 0 i for firm i is the level at which the marginal operational cost increase k i (f i ) equals the marginal increase in retail price value. (The impact of an increase of firm i's service level by a basis point on the average sales volume is identical to a decrease of the price by β i /b i units.) In particular, the (unique) equilibrium service level of a firm only depends on that firm's demand and cost functions. Thus, as in the MNL model but in contrast to the general attraction models, a firm's equilibrium service level is not affected by the attributes or equilibrium prices and service levels of any of its competitors.
The following represents a major contrast with the MNL model. Recall that in the latter, f 0 arises as the unique Nash equilibrium, and in fact dominant solution in the sequential two-stage game in which the firms first choose their service levels and in the second stage select their retail prices. In the linear model, this robustness result breaks down. In fact, even though the closed form solution for p * (f ) in (18) permits us to specify the profit functionŝ
in the first-stage game in closed form as well, these functions do not appear to have any structure which guarantees the existence of an equilibrium. The following example shows that f 0 fails to be a Nash equilibrium in the first-stage game. We conclude, in particular, that the equilibrium behavior of the industry may vary fundamentally, depending upon whether service levels and price levels are chosen simultaneously or sequentially. 7.94, 9.19, 9.20) . Table 1 compares the average sales volumes and expected profits for the retailers in the sequential and simultaneous games. Table 1 Retailer 1's clientele is relatively price sensitive but insensitive to service. Retailers 2 and 3, at the same time, cater to a segment of the market which is willing to pay higher prices in exchange for better service. Indeed, both in the simultaneous and the sequential game, retailer 1 adopts a lower service level and a lower price than its more "upscale" competitors.
Observe, however, that simultaneous determination of prices and service levels results in significantly less differentiation between the competing retailers than in the sequential setting.
Interestingly, retailer 1 adopts a significantly lower service level and a somewhat higher price in the sequential, as compared to the simultaneous game setting, correspondingly realizing higher profits. Retailers 2 and 3, similarly, adopt higher prices in the sequential setting but they compensate for their higher prices by offering better service. In the sequential setting, all retailers exploit their knowledge about all competitors' service levels to charge significantly larger prices, to achieve somewhat larger expected sales volumes and significantly larger profits. Finally, Figure 1 exhibits the dependency of p * 1 (f ) on f 1 , fixing f 2 = f * 2 and f 3 = f * 3 . It illustrates Theorem 7(c), showing that for sufficiently low service levels, i.e., f 1 ≤ f * 11 = 0.68, the equilibrium price of retailer 1 decreases in response to a service level increase, but increases for service levels above the critical level f * 11 . 
with
< 0, j = i and with the normalization ψ i (f, f, ..., f ) = 1. We further assume that the functions {ψ i (f ) : i = 1, ..., N } are log-supermodular in (f i , f j ) while the
Finally, to ensure a unique equilibrium in the reduced price game, we need
As shown in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) , many systems of standard demand functions, i.e., demand functions of price variables only, have the above log-supermodularity property, for example:
with r < 0 and γ > 0.
Moreover, (22) is satisfied in all four cases, except that in the linear case condition (D) needs to be satisfied, i.e., β i > j =i β ij , for all i.
One possible specification of the functions ψ(f ), analogous to (Logit) is:
The price game which arises under a fixed vector of service levels f is well known. Since, by assumption, the functions {q i (p)} are log-supermodular, the price game has a unique Nash equilibrium p * (f ) (see Milgrom and Roberts 1990) . It is also easily verified that the equilibrium price vector is increasing in all of the service levels as it is in all of the wholesale prices w and all of the holding cost rates h + . For example, the fact that
follows immediately from Topkis (1998), since
We thus proceed immediately to the analysis of the simultaneous reduced single stage game in which prices and service levels are selected simultaneously. Guaranteeing uniqueness of the equilibrium is more complex in this case. While a sufficient condition similar to (24) and involving various second order derivatives of π i can be derived, this condition does not appear to translate into simple conditions for the q i (·) and ψ i (·)
functions. However, as the single stage game is supermodular, even if multiple equilibria arise, they form a lattice, and there is a largest equilibrium which is preferred by all retailers.
In contrast to the MNL-and the linear model, but in accordance with the general attraction models, the equilibrium vector of service levels f * can no longer be determined by identifying for each firm i, at what service level the marginal operational cost k i (f i ) equals the marginal increase in "retail price value". Indeed, the equilibrium service level f * i for firm i may now depend on the demand and cost characteristics of all of its competitors.
However, since the simultaneous game is log-supermodular, an equilibrium pair (p * , f * ) may be computed by a tatônnement scheme similar to the one in § 5. As with the general attraction and linear models, little can be said about the equilibrium in the two-stage game. In general, f * fails to be an equilibrium in the first-stage game.
Conclusions
We have systematically characterized the infinite horizon equilibrium behavior under the three competition scenarios: (I) price-competition only, (II) simultaneous price-and service level competition, and (III) two-stage competition. We have shown that in each of these scenarios a Nash equilibrium of infinite horizon stationary strategies exists under which each retailer adopts a stationary price, fill rate and base-stock policy, provided a Nash equilibrium exists in a (reduced) single-stage ((I) and (II)) or two-stage game ((III)).
As far as the reduced price game characterizing scenario (I) is concerned, its equilibrium behavior is similar across all of the classes of demand functions considered. The price game always has a Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium is unique under widely satisfied conditions. The dependence of the equilibrium prices on the vector of service levels f varies, however, from one class of demand function to the next: little can be said for the general attraction model, but for the (generalized) MNL model, retailer i's price p * i is always increasing in its own service level and decreasing in the service level f j offered by any of his competitors j = i, as long as f j < f 0 j , (the unique service level for which the incremental operational costs equal the incremental retail price value), and increasing thereafter. In the linear demand model, each retailer i's equilibrium price p * i may no longer be increasing in his service level; instead −p * i is unimodal in its own and every competitor's service levels. Finally, in the log-separable model, each equilibrium price is increasing in all service levels.
Turning to the simultaneous single stage game which characterizes the simultaneous competition scenario (II), a Nash equilibrium (p * , f * ) exists for all of the considered classes of demand functions under mild conditions: in the general attraction model, it is sufficient that the attraction functions be log-concave (which they are in the specification of the MNL model), no restrictions are required in the linear model, while in the log-separable model, it is sufficient that the functions ψ i and q i be log-supermodular in (f i , f j ) and (p i , p j ), respectively. In the generalized MNL-and linear models, f * = f 0 , the unique break-even service level vector, so that each retailer's equilibrium service level is completely invariant to changes in the characteristics of any of the competitors. In the general attraction and the log-separable models, at the same time, each retailer needs to adjust his equilibrium service level in response to changes in the competitors' characteristics; in the former case, the adjustment is always in the opposite direction of the adjustment of the equilibrium price, implying that the retailer either becomes more or less competitive along both the price and service dimensions. Numerical examples show that under the log-separable model, the equilibrium service level may move in opposite or in the same direction.
Little can be said about the two-stage competition scenario (III), except in the (generalized) MNL model, where the vector of break-even service levels f 0 is again a Nash equilibrium and, in fact, a dominant solution in the first-stage game. Numerical examples for some of the other demand classes show that the equilibrium service level in the two-stage game may differ significantly from that which arises as part of the simultaneous game equilibrium.
We conclude that when estimating a system of (stochastic) demand equations, the proper class of demand models must be chosen with great care, since the choice has profound implications for the industry's equilibrium behavior in some or all of the considered competition scenarios. We hope that future empirical work, based on equilibrium models as in this paper, will characterize how firms in different industries position themselves in terms of their prices and (service) quality-levels and how the equilibrium in a given industry evolves in response to an external change. Graham et al. (1983) and Bailey et al. (1985) provide examples of descriptive studies of this type in the airline industry. Here, quality of service on a given route is measured by the frequency of an airline's flights on this route and the probability of finding an available seat on the flight closest to the passenger's preferred departure time.
12 Graham et al. (1983) and Bailey et al. (1985) focus on the impact of deregulation of the industry in 1978. They report that most airlines responded to the industry's deregulation by increasing their load factors (thus reducing this measure of service quality) while simultaneously decreasing their prices.
13
Our model can be extended to the case where some of the customers switch to a substitute retailer when they encounter a stockout. One possible model with substitution demand incorporates an N × N matrix P . Here, P ij is the probability that a customer of retailer i switches to retailer j when faced with a stockout. The switching probabilities in P would themselves depend on part or all of the price and service level vectors, i.e., P = P (p, f ).
It remains an open question whether this or a similar model with substitution demands is tractable.
12 Empirical studies usually aggregate both dimensions of quality via the average load factor, i.e., the total number of passengers divided by the seats available on a route. 13 See Jaskow and Rose (1989, §25.8) for a general survey of the impact of economic regulation on equilibria in a variety of industries. 
and with stationary and linear procurement and holding costs. An immediate adaptation of Federgruen and Heching (1999) shows that it is optimal for retailer i to adopt a stationary price p i , a fill rate f i and stationary base-stock policy with base-stock level y i such that (p i , f i , y i ) maximizes the profit function
The theorem thus follows from the fact that (p * , f * ) is a Nash equilibrium of the reduced single stage game.
Proof of Lemma 1. (a) For f
so k i is an increasing and differentiable function of f i .
Proof of Theorem 2. (a) We show that the profit functions
Since these functions are twice differentiable, supermodularity is equivalent to showing
Since each firm's set of feasible pricevalues is a compact lattice, it follows that the price-game is log-supermodular, establishing (a), see Topkis (1998) or Milgrom and Roberts (1990) .
(b) A unique Nash equilibrium p * (f ) is guaranteed, by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) 
Note from (4) and Lemma 2 that
Thus, (24) holds if
where the second inequality is equivalent to
Thus, (27) follows from (D) and (11). Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , it suffices to show that all
Proof of Theorem 3. (a) By
Lemma 1, this property is immediate for the first term. To verify concavity ford i , note from
by the concavity ofã i in p i and f i , while ∂ 2d i
The determinant of the Hessian ofd i equals: (Both terms in square brackets are non-negative by the joint concavity ofã i .) Because of the joint concavity of the functions {π i }, a Nash equilibrium satisfies equation (13) and:
Multiplying (13) (14) implicitly determines f * i as a function of p * i , and by the Implicit Function Theorem: 
Thus, for all j = i, ∂p * j /∂f i has the same sign as δ i (f i ), i.e., ∂p * j /∂f i < 0 for f i < f 
This identity is immediate from 
In other words, p * is the unique solution to the system of equations
This is a linear system of equations in p, which in matrix form can be written as: Proof of Theorem 8. We first verify that the profit functions
are jointly concave in (p i , f i ). Since k i (f ) is convex, both terms to the right of (45) are jointly concave as the composition of an increasing concave function and a jointly concave function.
This implies that any solution to the system of first order conditions
is a Nash equilibrium. Substituting (46) ; 0.5 ≤ f i < 1}. One easily verifies that no point on its boundary is an equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 9. Only part (b) requires a proof. To prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to show that the game is log-supermodular in the priceservice level variables. Letπ i = log π i , i = 1, ..., N . Note first that the space of feasi- 
